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Part I: Commentaries and Reflections
VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE UK SUPREME COURT
Professor Paula Giliker*
```The law of vicarious liability is on the move.'' ... It has not yet come to a stop.' 1
1 Introduction
The doctrine of vicarious liability is nothing if not controversial. It is, as
Lord Nicholls commented in the 2006 decision of Majrowski v Guy's and St
Thomas's NHS Trust, a doctrine that is `at odds with the general approach of
the common law' which favours imposing liability on individual defendants
whose actions (or inactions) are regarded as blameworthy by the law of
torts.2 Vicarious liability, in contrast, renders a defendant D2 (usually an
employer) strictly liable for the tortious behaviour of another party D1
(usually an employee) when acting in the course of his or her employment.
Liability arises without any finding of fault by D2. Nevertheless, as the
above quotation indicates, this is an area in which the UK Supreme Court
has been prepared to take a proactive role in extending and reshaping
the law. This article will focus on two recent Supreme Court decisions
which were both delivered on 2 March 2016: Cox v Ministry of Justice3 and
Mohamud vWMMorrison Supermarkets plc.4 These are important decisions,
which build on the framework for vicarious liability established by the
Supreme Court in its earlier 2012 ruling in Various Claimants v Catholic
ChildWelfare Society (`CCWS').5 The latter case adopted a two stage approach
to vicarious liability: the claimant must establish (1) that the relationship
between D1 and D2 is one capable of giving rise to vicarious liability and
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Bristol.
1 Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660, [1] (Lord Reed), quoting Various
Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1, [19] (Lord
Phillips).
2 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224, [8]. See also Patrick Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the
Law of Torts (Butterworths 1967) 12, who argues that vicarious liability runs counter to two
fundamental principles of English tort law: that one should only be liable for one's own acts
or omissions and that liability should be based on fault. 'These principles', he stated, 'are so
deeply rooted in legal thinking that any departure from them seems at first sight impossibly
unjust.'
3 Cox (n 1).
4 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677.
5 CCWS (n 1) [21] (Lord Phillips).
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(2) that a close connection links the relationship between D1 and D2 and
the act or omission of D1. These three cases establish the modern law of
vicarious liability. They have extended the doctrine, rendering it more
flexible. It now permits an increasing range of claimants to benefit from
its ability to act as a `loss distribution device', which ensures that victims are
able to obtain compensation from solvent defendants likely to be insured.6
Vicarious liability has also been applied in a variety of circumstances
including claims against unincorporated charitable associations (CCWS),
public bodies performing statutory functions for the public benefit (Cox)
and the more familiar target of large commercial concerns (Mohamud).
In this article, I will examine why the Supreme Court has been so willing
to extend a doctrine which seems at odds with the underlying principle of
corrective justice in the law of torts. The answer, it is submitted, lies in the
Court's belief that social justice requires that the courts should ensure that
innocent victims are able to obtain compensation from solvent defendants,
notably in the context of sexual abuse claims. In all three decisions, the
Court was therefore unwilling to leave an innocent victim at the mercy of
a claim against an uninsured tortfeasor likely to be of limited means. The
Supreme Court is creating, in its own words, `a fairer and more workable
test'.7 The question remains, however: What are now the limits to the
doctrine of vicarious liability and can such an extension be justified? When
and where will the law of vicarious liability finally come to a stop?
2 Expanding Vicarious Liability Beyond the Contract of
Employment: Cox v Ministry of Justice
The cases before the Supreme Court in Cox and Mohamud are helpful in
that they raised issues arising under each element of the two stage test
for vicarious liability identified in CCWS. In Cox, the Court was asked
to determine whether the relationship between a prisoner working in a
prison kitchen and the prison authorities was sufficient to qualify as a
`relationship' for vicarious liability (the `stage one' question). Mohamud
concerned the `stage two' question: The tortfeasor was clearly an employee
of Morrisons, but it was disputed whether a close connection existed
between his wrongful actions (assaulting a Morrisons customer) and his
6 See Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 215, [65] (Lord Millett); Dubai
Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366, [107] (Lord Millett):
`Vicarious liability is a loss distribution device based on grounds of social and economic
policy.'
7 Mohamud (n 4) [56] (Lord Dyson). See also Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd (n 6) [20] (Lord Steyn)
on the need to identify `a practical test serving as a dividing line between cases where it is
or is not just to impose vicarious liability'.
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employment by the defendant supermarket. The same Justices sat in both
cases, namely Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Dyson, Lord Reed, Lord
Toulson. The judgments are expressly stated to be complementary.8 The
aim, therefore, was to provide guidance and bring consistency to this area
of law.
In Cox, as stated above, the question was whether a relationship existed
sufficient to satisfy the stage one test. A prisoner is clearly not an employee
of a prison, indeed quite the opposite. Prisoners are bound to the prison
service not by contract but by their sentences; the relationship is not
founded on mutuality but on compulsion. Nevertheless, recent case-law
has indicated that while in the vast majority of cases the relationship that
gives rise to vicarious liability will be that of employer and employee,9 the
doctrine will extend to relationships which are `akin to that between an
employer and an employee'.10 Here, the claimant (the catering manager
at HM Prison Swansea) had worked with four members of staff, but also
about 20 prisoners who came under her supervision, in the prison kitchen.
Prisoners could apply to work in the kitchen and were paid a nominal
amount per week. Work was seen as part of their rehabilitation, but also
had the practical benefit of providing food to prisoners at a cheap rate.11
Mrs Cox had been injured by the negligence of a prisoner, Mr Inder, who
had dropped a sack of kitchen supplies on her back. The question was
whether the prison authorities would be held vicariously liable for her
injuries.
Both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court were prepared to identify the
relationship between a prisoner working in a prison kitchen and the prison
authorities as one `akin to employment'. On this basis, where the claimant
had been injured as a result of the negligence of the prisoner in carrying out
the activities assigned to him, the prison service would be vicariously liable
to her. The fact that the prison service was acting for the public benefit was
deemed irrelevant. In applying the `akin to employment' test, the Supreme
Court placed emphasis on the following facts:
(a) Prisoners working in the kitchenwere integrated into the
8 Cox (n 1) [1] (Lord Reed);Mohamud (n 4) [1] (Lord Toulson).
9 CCWS (n 1) [35] (Lord Phillips).
10 See e.g. E (or JGE) v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013]
QB 722; Janet O'Sullivan, `The Sins of the Father - Vicarious Liability Extended' [2012] CLJ
485.
11 See e.g. Cox vMinistry of Justice [2014] EWCACiv 132, [2015]QB 107, [44] (McCombe LJ):
`The work performed by these prisoners was one essential to the functioning of the prison.
The activity had to be performed by someone on behalf of the prison service and the activity
was part of the defendant's activity of providing secure and humane accommodation and
maintenance for the prisoners.'
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operation of the prison;
(b) Their work/activities furthered the aims of the prison, in
particular providing meals for prisoners;
(c) Theywere placed in a positionwhere there was a risk that
they might commit a variety of negligent acts within the
field of activities assigned to them;
(d) They worked under the direction of prison staff.12
The Court rejected the argument that liability would open the floodgates
to claims relating to the behaviour of prisoners undertaking educational
classes or offending behaviour programmes, finding that an `intelligible
distinction' existed between taking part in activities of this kind and
working as an integral part of the operation of the prison.13 This seems
to be correct. A prisoner assaulting a visiting creative writing teacher is
unlikely to be seen as furthering the aims of the prison, while a prisoner
who acts negligently while working in the prison kitchen or laundry would
seem to meet this test. What, however, of the negligent gardener who
accidentally strikes a prison warder with his rake? Is it clear, as Lord Reed
suggested, that the act of gardening is to be regarded solely as productive
(e.g. producing vegetables for the prison kitchen) rather than simply a
therapeutic activity (cf education)? Should it matter whether the prisoner
was growing vegetables or pruning the roses? As always, distinctions are
rarely watertight.
Cox does highlight, however, that the `akin to employment' category of
relationships is not simply a response to the errant priest problem. This
had been the context for previous `akin to employment' cases. For example,
in E (or JGE) v English Province of Our Lady of Charity14 the key issue was
whether the Roman Catholic Church could argue that it was not vicariously
liable for acts of abuse by a parish priest on the basis that, at law, a priest
is an office-holder and not an employee. The Court of Appeal refused
to accept that this technical distinction signified that the Roman Catholic
Church would not be found vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of its
priests. Vicarious liability, it held, should not be treated as a static concept
and would require adjustment to provide just solutions to the challenges
of changing times.15 A relationship `akin to employment', that is, where
12 Cox (n 1) [32] (Lord Reed).
13 ibid [43]-[44] (Lord Reed).
14 [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] QB 722.
15 ibid [60] (Ward LJ), relying in particular on the judgments in Viasystems (Tyneside) v
Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510.
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the relationship is so close in character to one of employer/employee that
it is just and fair to hold the employer vicariously liable, should therefore
suffice. While CCWS extended this test to lay brothers working for a school
but acting in furtherance of the mission of and subject to the directions
and rules of the De La Salle Institute,16 Cox is significant in contemplating
a wider application. It remains to be seen how far this new extension to
the traditional employer/employee relationship will go and whether a firm
line will be held. The Court of Appeal in NA v Nottinghamshire County
Council17 rejected the argument that it would apply to the relationship
between a local authority and foster parents; with Tomlinson LJ finding
`not the remotest of analogies'.18 It is important here to understand the
underlying rationale for the extension. As acknowledged in Mohamud,
the `akin to employment' category of relationships exists to respond to
changes in the employment practices of enterprises.19 On this basis, a
person who is to all extent and purposes an employee, albeit engaged via
an employment agency or some other temporary arrangement, should be
covered by the doctrine of vicarious liability. It is not intended, however,
that this new category should be unduly wide nor that it should undermine
the general rule that there is no vicarious liability for genuinely independent
contractors. The intention is to remove arbitrary distinctions between
different categories of workers within an organisation. Nevertheless, it
remains to be seen what degree of success ingenious counsel are likely to
have in future in attempting to extend this relationship to obtain the benefit
of vicarious liability for their clients.20
3 From `Course of Employment' to `Field of Activities':
Mohamud v WMMorrison Supermarkets plc
The facts of Mohamud raise the classic stage two dilemma: An angry
employee attacking a customer allegedly in defence of his employer's
property, but with clear underlying personal motives, here racism. This
16 See e.g. CCWS (n 1) [89] (Lord Phillips): `The relationship between the brothers and the
Institute was much closer to that of employment than the relationship between the priest
and the bishop in JGE.'
17 [2015] EWCA Civ 1139, [2016] 2WLR 1455.
18 ibid [15].
19 Mohamud (n 4) [55] (Lord Dyson). This was highlighted in the well-known McKendrick
article cited in JGE (n 14): see Ewan McKendrick, `Vicarious Liability and Independent
Contractors – A Re-Examination' (1990) 53 MLR 777. The Court in JGE also found
the article of Richard Kidner, `Vicarious Liability: For Whom Should The `Employer' Be
Liable?' (1995) 15 LS 47 to be `most illuminating and helpful'.
20 The claimant in the case of NA v Nottinghamshire County Council (n 17), for example, has
been granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
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issue had inevitably arisen in earlier case law, but with mixed results.21
Here, Mr Mohamud had suffered a serious assault when, having checked
his tyre pressure on the Morrisons' garage forecourt, he entered the kiosk
to enquire whether it would be possible to print some documents from a
USB stick he was carrying. He was met with abuse from Mr Khan, who
was working at the kiosk at the time, who then followed him onto the
forecourt, told him in threatening words never to come back and then
physically assaulted him, despite instructions from his supervisor to desist.
The question for the court was whether such appalling conduct was `closely
connected' to Mr Khan's job, which was to see that the petrol pumps and
the kiosk were kept in good running order and to serve customers.
The Supreme Court held that it was. The Court rejected the claimant's
argument that the court should develop a new stage two test based on
whether the employee was acting in a representative capacity. This
argument rested on the fact that companies operate via human agents and
that, in view of judicial criticism of the imprecision of the close connection
test, it was permissible to suggest an alternative formulation: whether
a reasonable observer would consider the employee to be acting in the
capacity of a representative of the employer at the time of committing
the tort? This test was, in the Court's view, `hopelessly vague'.22 As
the Supreme Court rightly stated, this does seem to be replacing one
imprecise test with another, but we might speculate that counsel, assuming
that Mr Khan's conduct was likely to fail any formulation of the `close
connection' test, was merely seeking to suggest a looser formulation which
might be established before the court. Such resourcefulness was, however,
unnecessary. The Court unanimously accepted thatMrKhan's conduct was
within the course of his employment.
The stage two course of employment test has a long pedigree.23 In its
traditional form, stated by textbookwriter Salmond in 1907, the tortfeasor's
act must be shown to be `a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing
some act authorised by the master'.24 As Lord Toulson in Mohamud
noted, although popular, this test was not universally satisfactory and, in
21 See, for example, Keppel Bus Co Ltd v Ahmad [1974] 1 WLR 1082 (no vicarious liability for
violent bus conductor); Petterson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd [1948] NZLR 136 (vicarious liability
for violent barman); Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370 (no vicarious liability for
violent barmaid).
22 Mohamud (n 4) [53] (Lord Dyson).
23 It can be dated back to the late seventeenth century: see Boson v Sandford (1691) 2 Salk 440,
91 ER 382; Tuberville v Stamp (1698) 1 Ld Raym 264, 91 ER 1072. See John Fleming, The
Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC Information Services 1998) 409.
24 John Salmond, The Law of Torts (1st ed, Stevens and Haynes 1907) 83 (later found in Robert
Heuston and Richard Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Tort (21st ed, Sweet and
Maxwell 1996) 443).
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particular, it was difficult to apply in the context of intentional torts, adding
that `even on its most elastic interpretation, the sexual abuse of ... children
could not be described as a mode, albeit an improper mode, of caring for
them'.25 More fundamentally, when in 2001 the House of Lords in Lister v
Hesley Hall Ltd26 decided that it would be fair and just that sexual abuse by a
warden of a school boarding house should satisfy the course of employment
test, it became clear that the Salmond test would need modification. This
led to a test of close connection: Were the torts of the warden so closely
connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold
the employers vicariously liable?27 Yet, as Lord Phillips acknowledged in
CCWS,28 it is not easy to deduce from Lister the precise criteria that will
give rise to vicarious liability. Fundamentally, the test of `close connection'
tells us little about the nature of that connection and exactly how close that
connection needs to be.29 While flexibility may be needed in order to apply
the test to the facts of individual cases, Lord Toulson conceded that it would
be desirable if the essence of the test could be simplified. On this basis, two
matters required consideration:
(a) What functions or `field of activities' have been entrusted
by the employer to the employee (or, in everyday lan-
guage, what was the nature of the employee's job)?
(b) Whether there is a sufficient connection between the
position in which the employee is employed and his
wrongful conduct to make it `right' for the employer to
be held liable as a matter of social justice?30
Here Mr Khan's job was to attend to customers and respond to their
enquiries. In the Court's view, he had simply engaged in a foulmouthed and
25 Mohamud (n 4) [39].
26 Lister v Hall Ltd (n 6), reversing Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] LGR 584.
27 ibid [28] (Lord Steyn). His Lordship sought support for this test based on a passage from
Salmond which had been overlooked: `a master . . . is liable even for acts which he has not
authorised, provided they are so connected with acts which he has authorised, that they
may rightly be regarded as modes - although improper modes - of doing them': Salmond (n
24) 83-4. Salmond's explanation, his Lordship argued, was the germ of the close connection
test which had been adumbrated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley v Curry (1999)
174 DLR (4th) 45 and Jacobi v Griffiths (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71. These decisions were
described at the time as `a genuine advance on the unauthorised conduct/unauthorised
mode distinction' see e.g. Peter Cane, `Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse' (2000) 116
LQR 21, 24.
28 CCWS (n 1) [74]. See also Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd (n 6) [25] (Lord Nicholls).
29 Textbook writers agree: see Edwin Peel and James Goudkamp,Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort
(19th ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2014), 21-021; Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law:
Text and Materials (5th ed, OUP 2013) 835-37.
30 Mohamud (n 4) [44]-[45].
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violent means of undertaking the `field of activities' assigned to him. The
entire sequence of eventswas judged to be seamless: MrKhan sought simply
to remove Mr Mohamud from his employer's premises – he did not, in the
words of the Court, metaphorically take off his uniform.31 He had been
entrusted with the task of serving customers and it was `just' for Morrisons
to be vicariously liable for his gross abuse of this position.
Such a ruling does seem to take the course of employment test to its absolute
limits. Mr Khan's motives, we are told, are irrelevant – personal racism is
no longer an obstacle to vicarious liability. Lord Toulson went so far as
to indicate that `This was not something personal between them'.32 His
Lordship's judgment is revealing, however, in how we have reached such
a broad interpretation of this test; his Lordship using variants of the term
`broad' 11 times. Use of the term `field of activities'33 is deemed to conjure up
a wider range of conduct than acts done in furtherance of the employment.
The connection thus becomes looser. More specifically, his Lordship placed
emphasis on social justice and the view of Lord Chief Justice Holt, who
argued that `seeing somebody must be a loser by this [tortious act], it is
more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the
deceiver should be a loser, than a stranger.'34 As a matter, therefore, of
justice, the choice betweenwho should bear the loss – employer v. innocent
victim – tips in favour of the victim. The key to liability is the employment
relationship connecting tortfeasor and employer and the `tasks' entrusted
to the employee. Provided a connection exists, vicarious liability will
bite. Social justice thus justifies the imposition of a mechanism by which
innocent victims can obtain compensation, albeit at the expense of innocent
employers (or at least their insurers).
It is clear that the Supreme Court was not making a rash or ill-considered
decision in Mohamud, nor indeed in Cox. These two Supreme Court
decisions, taken with CCWS, represent a firm resolution to extend the
doctrine of vicarious liability to ensure compensation for victims. A parallel
development is also taking place in the field of non-delegable duties, as
evidenced by the 2013 decision of the UK Supreme Court in Woodland v
Essex CC.35 The question which this article will now address is why this is
31 ibid [47] (Lord Toulson). Warren v Henlys [1948] 2 All ER 935 was distinguished on this
basis – a ruling which arguably only serves to highlight the fragility of the concept of an
unbroken series of events. See also Andrew Bell, `Vicarious Liability: Quasi-Employment
and Close Connection' (2016) 32(2) Professional Negligence 153, 157.
32 ibid.
33 Lord Toulson derived this term from the judgment of Lord Cullen in Central Motors
(Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co 1925 SC 796, 802.
34 Hern v Nichols (1700) 1 Salk 289, 91 ER 256.
35 [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537. The relationship between vicarious liability and
non-delegable duties remains a matter of contention in that both doctrines impose liability
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happening. On what basis can such an extension of strict liability contrary
to the dominant philosophy of corrective justice in tort be justified?
4 Justifying the Expansion of Vicarious Liability
The judgments in Cox andMohamud approach the question of justifying the
extension of liability at stages one and two of the test for vicarious liability
in different ways. Lord Toulson in Mohamud favoured an approach which
examined the historical development of this branch of the law. This led
the Court to a foundation based on social justice in which the risk of an
employee misusing his position is deemed to be one of life's unavoidable
facts. Lord Reed in Cox, in contrast, followed a more overtly policy led
approach. His starting point was the statement by Lord Phillips in CCWS36
of the policy reasons which render it fair, just and reasonable to impose
vicarious liability on the employer:
(a) The employer is more likely to have the means to com-
pensate the victim than the employee and can be expected
to have insured against that liability (the `deeper pockets'
argument);
(b) The tort will have been committed as a result of activity
being undertaken by the employee on behalf of the
employer (the delegation of task argument);37
(c) The employee's activity is likely to be part of the business
activity of the employer (the theory of enterprise liabil-
ity);38
(d) The employer, by employing the employee to carry on the
activity, will have created the risk of the tort committed
by the employee (the risk creation argument);
on an employer for the torts of its workers, albeit one imposes secondary liability, the
other primary liability. For criticism of the distinction between these two doctrines, see:
GlanvilleWilliams, `Liability for Independent Contractors' [1956] CLJ 180; Fleming (n 23)
433; Robert Stevens, `Non-Delegable Duties and Vicarious Liability' in Jason Neyers, Erika
Chamberlain and Stephen Pitel, Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart 2007); JonathanMorgan,
`Liability for Independent Contractors in Contract and Tort: Duties to Ensure that Care is
Taken' [2015] CLJ 109.
36 CCWS (n 1) [35].
37 Lord Reed linked this argument with historical explanations of vicarious liability based on
deemed authorisation or delegation: Cox (n 1) [23].
38 Note that Lord Reed expressly excluded the argument that this signifies that the defendant
must be carrying on activities of a commercial nature or be a profit-making enterprise: Cox
(n 1) [30].
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(e) The employeewill, to a greater or lesser degree, have been
under the control of the employer (the control test).
As is widely acknowledged, the control test derives from the social con-
ditions of an earlier age where employers could direct and instruct their
employees.39 The significance of control today is that the employer can
direct what the employee does, but not generally how he does it.40 It is
therefore not regarded by the Supreme Court to be of independent signif-
icance in most cases. The Court also acknowledged the limitations of the
deeper pockets argument in failing to provide a principled justification for
imposing vicarious liability.41 For the Supreme Court, therefore, it was the
arguments based on enterprise liability, risk creation and delegation of task
which provided inter-related justifications for extending vicarious liability.
These arguments are deemed to have a basis in the historical background
to the doctrine but they also explain and justify the recent developments
in CCWS, Viasystems42 and JGE.43 We can also draw comparisons with the
judgment of McLachlin J in the Canadian case of Bazley v Curry44 which
first introduced the `close connection' test which was adopted by the House
of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd in 2001. The Supreme Court of Canada
in Bazley favoured an approach based solely on enterprise liability, argu-
ing that it is fair and just to impose liability on the person or organisation
that puts into the community an enterprise which creates or significantly
increases the risk of injury to victims by virtue of the individuals it uses to
carry out its business or further its interests. Vicarious liability can thus be
justified in that it provides an adequate and just remedy for losses which re-
sult from the enterprise with, it is anticipated, the added benefit of having
a deterrent effect which will encourage organisations to take steps to pre-
vent future incidents.45 McIvor notes, however, that the formof risk theory
used by Lord Millett in Lister46 (and by the Supreme Court subsequently)
39 See Otto Kahn-Freund, `Servants and Independent Contractors' (1951) 14 MLR 504;
Kidner (n 19); Paula Giliker,Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective (CUP 2010)
60-5.
40 CCWS (n 1) [36] (Lord Phillips); Cox (n 1) [21] (Lord Reed).
41 See Glanville Williams, `Vicarious Liability and the Master's Indemnity' (1957) 20 MLR
220, 232; Giliker (n 39) 234-237.
42 Viasystems (Tyneside) (n 15).
43 JGE (n 14).
44 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) [45], in turn influenced by Alan Sykes, `The Boundaries of Vicarious
Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines' (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 563. See also Douglas Brodie, `Enterprise
Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability' (2007) 27 OJLS 493; Gregory Keating, `The Theory
of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability' (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law
Review 1285.
45 ibid [41] (McLachlin J).
46 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd (n 6) [65], [83].
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is much wider and more generalised than the economic rationale set out
by McLachlin J in Bazley.47 This leads, as we can see above, to a broader
justificatory framework which includes, for example, the delegation of task
argument. While we can say that vicarious liability will be regarded as fair
and just where the commission of a wrongful act is an inherent risk of the
business activities in which the employer is engaged and within the field of
activities assigned to the tortfeasor, this is far from an exact science. Cre-
ation of the risk of the commission of a tort as the inevitable consequence of
the employment relationship represents an important element in the facts
giving rise to the imposition of liability on the employer, but, the Court
has acknowledged,48 is not enough by itself. This leads to the conclusion
that the test formulated by the Supreme Court gives the court flexibility in
applying it to the facts of each individual case, but it undeniably lacks pre-
cision. Further, it remains the case that there will come a point where the
risk in question cannot be said to arise due to the employment relationship
and thus cannot be said to be closely connected to the task delegated to the
employee which is an integral part of the employer's business activities. To
use a straightforward example, if I decide one morning that I will hit every
red-haired person I meet on my way to work, my resolution has not been
created as a risk of my employment nor is it closely connected to my job as
a university lecturer. However, if my decision is to strike every red-haired
student I teach who does not understand the doctrine of vicarious liability,
the situation is arguably different. This highlights the key question which
this article must now address: What, following Mohamud and Cox, are the
limits to vicarious liability?
5 Examining the Impact of Cox andMohamud
In expanding vicarious liability to include relationships `akin to employ-
ment' andwrongful acts which occur as an inherent risk of the field of activ-
ities delegated to the tortfeasor as part of the business activities of the defen-
dant, it is clear that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the valuable role
of vicarious liability as an instrument of social justice in making sure that
victims obtain compensation for torts committed against them. In so doing,
the division between employees and independent contractors has been ad-
justed to include a new category of formerly independent contractors, now
classified as quasi-employees for the sake of the doctrine of vicarious liabil-
ity. Cox, it is submitted, provides a helpful addition to the law. There is a
strong case in terms of distributive justice and logic for moving away from
47 Claire McIvor, `The Use and Abuse of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability' (2006) 35
Common LawWorld Review 268, 277.
48 See CCWS (n 1) [87] (Lord Phillips).
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a narrow interpretation of the contract of employment, dominated by the
reasoning of employment law, and for extending vicarious liability to rela-
tionships akin to employment.49 Stepping away from the legal niceties of
who, technically, is classified as an `employee' in labour law is a positive step.
The logic of Cox, therefore, is obvious. It should not matter whether it is
an official employee of the prison or an unofficial employee (i.e. a prisoner
working in the kitchen) who negligently injures Mrs Cox – if the individ-
ual bears all the characteristics of an employee then that should be enough
for the application of a doctrine which is based on concerns relating to so-
cial justice. As Ward LJ acknowledged in JGE, the question should be one
of function not form.50 This reflects the realities of modern employment
relationships and changes in workplace practice and the increasing com-
plexity and sophistication of the organisation of enterprises in the modern
world.51 This should not, however, result in a free-for-all for any individual
who helps an employer out with work in some way. As a logical extension
to the stage one relationship test, Cox should receive a cautious welcome.
Mohamud, however, requires a deeper intake of breath. An unprovoked
racist attack on a customer at a petrol station is deemed within the course
of employment on the basis that it could be connected, albeit broadly, with
the job of the kiosk attendant to serve customers. It was deemed irrelevant
that the tortfeasor was acting for reasons of his own or that he had no
responsibility for keeping order or authority over customers. The `field of
activities' test clearly adopts a farmore generous approach to the tortfeasor's
job description.52 Significantly, Lord Toulson refused to rate the closeness
of the connection needed on a scale of one to ten and confined himself to the
comment that the cases in which the necessary connection has been found
are those in which `the employee used or misused the position entrusted to
him in a way which injured the third party'.53 Potential difficulties with this
test may be identified by changing the facts of Mohamud slightly. Would,
for example, the situation have been different if MrMohamud had stopped
at the petrol station merely to enquire for directions to the post office?
Would the imposition of vicarious liability depend on (a) whether he had
decided to purchase a chocolate bar or check his tyre pressure whilst at the
petrol station, thereby giving him the status of `customer' or (b) whether his
enquiry related in some way to a service which Morrisons might or might
49 See Paula Giliker, `Vicarious Liability Beyond the Contract of Service' (2012) 28(1)
Professional Negligence 291, 295.
50 JGE (n 14) [60].
51 As acknowledged by Lord Dyson in Mohamud (n 4) [55]; see also Hugh Collins, `Indepen-
dent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment Protection
Laws' (1990) 10 OJLS 353.
52 See e.g. Axon v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 787 (QB), [91]-[95] (Nicol J).
53 Mohamud (n 4) [45].
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not offer? Would it be of assistance if Mr Mohamud usually bought his
petrol atMorrisons, enabling him to be regarded as a regular customer? The
issue here is that the test of `course of employment' is becoming increasingly
fact specific. Imprecision is not regarded as a problemby the SupremeCourt
and indeed tort law often faces evaluative judgments due to its need to adapt
to each particular case, but one of the roles of the SupremeCourt in a system
of stare decisis is to give guidance to lower courts. Does Mohamud clarify
when vicarious liability will arise or merely suggest that it will be easier to
establish in future?
At this point, it is important to revert back to the underlying rationale
of vicarious liability discussed above. By focusing on the creation of risk,
the notion of enterprise liability and the delegation of integral duties to
an employee, the Court has been able to adopt a broader formulation of
vicarious liability which will now include acts which, in the past, would
have been dismissed as outside the course of employment. While greater
flexibility was needed in terms of the employment relationship (as indicated
above), such a generous approach does become problematic in terms of the
factor which, it should be recalled, exists to limit vicarious liability: that
the wrongful act must be within the scope of the employment relationship.
Reliance on risk also comes at a price. Brodie, for example, asks whether
the employee/independent contractor division can withstand a focus on
enterprise liability.54 McIvor also argues that a focus on risk creation
makes it difficult to justify confining vicarious liability to employers –
logically, it should be extendable to any risk-producing activity which leads
to damage to innocent individuals.55 It also fails to explain why tort law
is the best means of addressing these risks in contrast to, for example,
imposing penalties on the employer in criminal law or introducing a public
compensation fund. Yet, the more flexible approach, which a focus on risk
provides, has enabled the Supreme Court to meet the concerns related to
social justice in the light of abuse scandals affecting institutions, such as the
Roman Catholic Church and the BBC. Indeed, the Supreme Court in CCWS
expressly alluded to concerns arising from allegations of the widespread
sexual abuse of children within the entertainment industry, which were
prominent in the media at the time the case was decided.56 Lister, JGE and
54 Brodie (n 44) 508. See also James Plunkett, `Taking Stock of Vicarious Liability' (2016) 132
LQR 556, 559-560.
55 McIvor (n 47) 296. As I have noted elsewhere, a focus on risk in French law has led to
wide-ranging liability under the French Civil Code (strict liability in tort/delict) which
extends to parental liability for the torts of their children up to the age of 18, see Giliker (n
39) 237-41.
56 CCWS (n 1) [85] (Lord Phillips). Notably the Jimmy Savile scandal, which came to
light after Savile's death in October 2011 and which led to a number of subsequent in-
quiries, including a high profile inquiry by the BBC into its culture and practices during
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CCWS all involved victims of sexual abuse seeking recompense from the
institutions responsible for the abusers in question. What is distinctive
about Cox and Mohamud, however, is that these are not sexual abuse
cases, but examples of traditional vicarious liability scenarios in which the
question is whether an employment relationship exists or whether the
misconduct of the employee takes him outside the scope of his employment.
The Supreme Court rulings are therefore significant in indicating that
sexual abuse cases are not a separate category of claims. The extension of
vicarious liability tomeet the facts of Lister, JGE and CCWS applies generally
to all cases. The societal need to respond to sexual abuse scandals has
therefore had a permanent impact on the shaping of the modern doctrine
of vicarious liability.
6 Conclusions
In Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc, Lord Dyson expressed the
view that `[t]o search for certainty and precision in vicarious liability is
to undertake a quest for a chimaera.'57 Some might regard this as an
understatement as the Supreme Court in Cox and Mohamud showed a
clear preference for flexibility above certainty. It is true, as Lord Nicholls
acknowledged in Dubai Aluminium v Salaam,58 that given the variety of
circumstances which can arise, a rigid test would not work well in this
area of law, but the breadth of both the relationship and course of
employment/close connection tests will have to be tried in future litigation.
In this article, it has been argued that the decision in Cox is to be welcomed
as an incremental and logical extension of the `akin to employment' test
recognised by the Court of Appeal in JGE and the Supreme Court in
CCWS. Reservations have been expressed, however, in relation to the
`simplified' two stage Mohamud test, in which the court will examine the
field of activities entrusted to the employee and whether there is a sufficient
connection between these tasks and the tort to make it `right' for the
employer to be held liable as a matter of social justice. This seems to leave
key value judgments with the trial judge and the application of the test in
Mohamud itself suggests that much will rest on how the court characterises
the facts of the case. Is the act of a racist employee shouting abuse at an
individual entering his employer's premises significantly connected to his
concern to remove the individual from these premises or simply an act of
abusewhich hewould have committedwhether he hadmet the individual in
the years Savile had worked for the corporation: see the report of Dame Janet Smith
published in 2016 (BBC, `The Dame Janet Smith Review' (BBC) <www.bbc.co.uk/bbc-
trust/dame_janet_smith> accessed 4 August 2016).
57 Mohamud (n 4) [54].
58 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam (n 6) [26].
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a nightclub or while watching a game of football? Will vicarious liability be
confined to customers or extend to any individual who chooses to make an
enquiry and who could be a potential customer? In accepting imprecision,
the Supreme Court leaves the law subject to uncertainty. We may regard
this as the acceptable price of ensuring that the victims sexually abused
by priests can obtain compensation when the original culprits have either
disappeared or have passed away.59 The question remains, however, to
what extent it is equally acceptable in the context of vicarious liability
claims generally. One prediction may be made. The scope of the doctrine
of vicarious liability will continue to be tested as claimants gain greater
confidence that claims, which previously would have had no likelihood of
success, may under the new regime be deemed just and fair. This is good
news for tort victims, but likely to be less welcome to employers, who
now find themselves strictly liable for the acts and omissions of a growing
number of individuals for actions varying from the negligent carrying of
kitchen supplies to racist attacks. One is left to wonder where, after three
Supreme Court decisions in four years, this leaves the legal development of
the doctrine of vicarious liability. Can, as the Supreme Court clearly hopes,
the two stage test in CCWS, assisted by previous judicial decisions in the
same or analogous contexts, provide sufficient guidance for future cases?
The fact that the Supreme Court is due to hear an appeal in February 201760
in which one of the questions relates to the factors needed to establish
vicarious liability does suggest that Cox andMohamud are far from the end
of this story.
59 In JGE (n 14), for example, the priest in question was dead. Equally, in the earlier case
of Maga v Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust [2010] EWCA Civ 256,
[2010] 1WLR 1441 the priest, Father Clonan, had disappeared and was presumed dead.
60 Appeal from NA v Nottinghamshire CC (n 17), due to be heard in February 2017. It should
also be noted that the High Court of Australia in October 2016 (Prince Alfred College
Incorporated v ADC [2016]HCA37) refused, at [83], to follow theMohamud test, preferring a
test of whether the employment provides `the occasion for the commission of the wrongful
act', although it remains to be seen whether its multi-faceted test for `occasion' will offer
any greater clarity in practice.
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